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A preliminary court injunction based on alleged personal security risks to managers and 
directors gave Brazilian public companies the option of non-compliance with the most 
sensitive part of newly mandated compensation disclosure rules. We find, however, no 
association between state-level crime data and non-compliance, which is possibly 
motivated by agency conflicts. Non-compliers tend to present lower corporate governance 
(CG) quality, higher ownership concentration, larger total assets, and less profitability. 
State and foreign owned companies are significantly less likely non-compliers. 
Shareholders correctly anticipated that lower CG quality firms were more likely to exercise 
their non-compliance option, but may have been negatively surprised when some higher 
CG quality firms did not comply.  
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1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The corporate governance literature usually assesses the firm-level and country-
level determinants of voluntary compliance of firms with recommended practices 
(CHHAOCHHARIA and LAEVEN, 2009; MACNEIL and LI, 2006; NOWAK, ROTT, and 
MAHR, 2006; BERGLÖF and PAJUSTE, 2005). Regulatory demands, on the other hand, 
are of a mandatory nature and one usually expects all firms to comply.  
A recent regulation introduced in Brazil in 2009 (that became effective in 2010) 
requires public firms to provide more details about the compensation of the management 
team and board of directors (BOD). It demands firms to report the maximum, average, 
and minimum individual compensation of both top managers and directors, in addition to 
many other requirements. Reporting the maximum individual compensation of directors 
and senior managers was considered by some to be akin to revealing the compensation of 
the BOD chair and Chief Executive Officer (CEO),1 respectively, even though the new 
regulation does not require the reporting of compensation on an individual and identified 
basis.   
A number of corporate representatives voiced their concerns about the new 
regulation using their personal safety as pretext and claiming that Brazilian crime rates are 
high.2 The Brazilian Institute of Finance Executives (IBEF, Instituto Brasileiro de Executivos 
de Finanças) is an association whose membership includes many senior financial officers 
in the country. It obtained a preliminary injunction providing companies the right not to 
comply with the new regulation. Regulators tried to overturn it but companies may have 
this non-compliance option for many years given the Brazilian judiciary slowness (GILSON, 
HANSMANN, and PARGENDLER, 2010).  
The Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC, Instituto Brasileiro de 
Governança Corporativa) and the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM, Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários) produced codes of good corporate governance practices that 
recommend full and individual disclosure of compensation information. However, 
adherence to the Brazilian codes is strictly voluntary, with no ‘comply or explain’ 
requirement.3  
Instead of defective or partial compliance with voluntary corporate governance 
recommendations, the decision to resort to an overt legal right of non-compliance with 
disclosure regulations constitutes an interesting case because it offers an opportunity to 
investigate a situation of explicit and full non-compliance with corporate governance law 
as well as the nature of the companies that decided to exercise it. This collective refusal to 
comply may be considered a setback in the recently developed reputation of Brazil as a 
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country with good corporate governance practices, at least among emergent markets, 
because transparency regarding BOD and executive compensation is a key 
recommendation of codes of best practices around the world (BERGLÖF and PAJUSTE, 
2005). 
The successful introduction of premium listing segments in 2000 is at the heart of 
the recently acquired Brazilian reputation for good corporate governance practices among 
developing nations. Companies may voluntarily join or migrate to the premium tiers by 
means of a private contract with the Brazilian Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa) wherein 
they agree to enact several disclosure and corporate governance practices besides what is 
legally required.  
The Brazilian case permits to ascertain the kind of company that is more prone to 
shun regulatory compensation disclosure, thus publicly confronting corporate governance 
practices widely appreciated by investors. Companies that decide not to comply with the 
new compensation disclosure rule in Brazil may have similarities regarding their adherence 
to corporate governance practices, ownership concentration, controlling shareholder type, 
and financial performance, for example. In contrast, if the non-compliance decision is not 
associated to any of these characteristics, then the alleged personal safety of the highest 
paid individuals may be the actual reason. 
We formulate and test a set of hypotheses related to the determinants of the 
decision not to comply. We find that non-complying firms score significantly lower in 
corporate governance practices and are less frequently listed in the two most demanding 
premium-listing segments of BM&FBovespa. Ownership is substantially more concentrated 
and there are significantly less foreign-controlled and state-owned companies among non-
complying firms. Larger companies, companies with higher aggregate compensation 
offered to senior managers and directors, and those exhibiting lower profitability are also 
less likely to comply with the new regulation. Finally, we find that the likelihood of non-
compliance is unrelated to crime rates within the state where the firm is headquartered. 
This peculiar Brazilian situation also offers an opportunity to check how market 
prices respond when firms choose not to comply with the law, rather than with voluntary 
‘comply or explain’ provisions. Our event study around the confirmation of the preliminary 
injunction by a higher court, which effectively granted firms the option not to comply with 
the disclosure regulation, suggests that shareholders correctly anticipated that firms with 
better CG practices were less likely to use the injunction. The results from a second event 
study, around the date reports are filed, are weaker, but consistent with the idea that the 
market impact is worse for companies with better CG standards, which may have surprised 
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their outside shareholders negatively by deciding not to comply with a regulation aligned 
with good CG practices.  
Overall, we provide suggestive evidence that relevant agency conflicts have partly 
motivated the decision to challenge the regulation. Therefore, our findings may contribute 
to weaken the arguments based on the security threat posed by the disclosure of detailed 
compensation information as well as to justify the negative reactions of shareholders and 
investor advisors when companies opt to be opaque about the compensation of their 
managers (see, for example, CARVALHO and TORRES, 2011). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review on the corporate 
governance and disclosure compliance literature most closely associated with our paper. 
In section 3 we provide some background information about the Brazilian case. Section 4 
presents our hypotheses, while Section 5 offers a description of the sample, operational 
definitions of our main variables, and descriptive statistics. In section 6 we discuss the 
results from the analysis of the determinants of non-compliance, while section 7 presents 
evidence from the event studies. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 -  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Our article stems from the corporate governance and disclosure compliance 
literature that suggests that there is ample room for firm choice given that corporate 
governance practices that may impact value and the enforcement of such rules tend to 
vary both at the firm as well as at the country levels (BLACK, CARVALHO, and GORGA, 
2012; ROBINSON, XUE, and YU, 2011; SILVEIRA, LEAL, CARVALHAL-DA-SILVA, and 
BARROS, 2010; AGGARWAL, EREL, STULZ, and WILLIAMSON, 2009; DAHYA, 
DIMITROV, and MCCONNELL, 2008; BERGLÖF and PAJUSTE, 2005).  
Robinson et al. (2011) investigate disclosure defects, defined as partial non-
compliance with new 2006 US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) compensation 
disclosure regulations. They argue that no company in a random sample of 336 firms 
selected by the SEC disclosed without defects, varying in gravity and kind at the firm-level. 
The authors also admit that firms selected by the SEC corrected the problems after some 
time while firms in another random sample compiled by the authors did not, which 
suggests that non-compliance was a choice rather than a mistake. They also find that non-
disclosure is related to excessive compensation and previous negative media attention 
about it.  
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Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) build a measure of the deviation between what was 
actually reported by firms and what was required by regulators. They conclude that firm-
level financial variables do not explain deviations from mandatory disclosure while 
country-level measures convey that disclosure is positively and significantly related with a 
“rule of law” measure. The authors show that, on average, firms in six out of ten Central 
and Eastern European countries disclose less than what was legally required in 2003. They 
argue (p. 182) that large controlling shareholders may influence lawmaking, regulators, 
and enforcers through their political connections, weakening enforcement efforts. Thus, 
they conjecture that there is less disclosure when ownership concentration is greater.  
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) report that the introduction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and other accompanying regulatory changes had a value increasing effect on 
larger firms that were previously less compliant with these new provisions, while smaller 
firms experienced value reduction, probably due to their greater cost to comply. 
Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) affirm that firms that adopt corporate governance 
practices beyond what is commonly observed by all firms in a country present greater 
valuations in a sample of 2701 companies in 23 developed countries. They also conclude 
that the market rewards companies that display better practices than what is required by 
the law in their jurisdictions or generally practiced by their country peers, akin to what was 
verified for Brazil (CARVALHO and PENNACCHI, 2012; BRAGA-ALVES and SHASTRI, 
2011; CHAVEZ and SILVA, 2009; LEAL and CARVALHAL-DA-SILVA, 2007). The value 
effect of an announcement of compliance with voluntary “comply or explain” corporate 
governance provisions depends on the nature of the provision (FERNÁNDEZ-RODRÍGUEZ, 
GÓMEZ-ANSÓN, and CUERVO-GARCÍA, 2004).  
There is also evidence that investors are complacent with serial non-compliers with 
the “comply or explain” Combined Code in the UK, as long as their financial performance 
is good. Self-regulation may not be strong enough in the UK and Germany, where there 
were no wealth effects resulting from the announcement of compliance with the German 
Corporate Governance Code, and there is a ongoing debate to incorporate it into the law 
(MACNEIL and LI, 2006; NOWAK et al., 2006).   
In Brazil, Costa, Galdi, Motoki, and Sanchez (2012) relate direct disclosure costs, 
represented by personal security risk, with disclosure decisions. They conclude that local 
crime and CEO compensation levels are associated to the decision of non-compliance 
with compensation disclosure demanded by the new CVM regulation from 2010. They 
also claim that non-compliant firms present greater market risk, represented by their larger 
bid-ask spread, as well as a decline in market trading liquidity. Schiehll, Terra, and Victor 
(2013) analyze the determinants of voluntary executive stock options disclosure in a 
sample of 68 Brazilian firms prior to the introduction of the mandatory detailed 
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compensation disclosure in 2009. They conclude that family controlled companies tend to 
disclose less and that companies with larger BODs, that employ compensation 
committees, and that are audited by one of the big-four auditors, disclose more. Silveira 
and Dias Jr. (2009) find that news that expose conflicts of interest between controlling and 
minority shareholders in Brazil are value reducing with a potentially permanent effect.  
 
3 - THE BRAZILIAN CASE 
 
Article 152 of Law 6404 of 1976, the Brazilian corporate law, requires companies 
to disclose solely the sum of the total maximum annual pay of the BOD and top 
management authorized by shareholders in their annual meeting. Thus, Brazilian listed 
companies historically did not provide any details about the composition of the 
compensation of their top management.  
The fourth version of the code of corporate governance practices produced by the 
IBGC in 20094 recommended, for the first time, that compensation should be preferably 
disclosed for each individual in the BOD and senior management team. Alternatively, it 
suggested that the total amounts paid to the BOD and top management should be 
disclosed separately, detailing their fixed and variable portions. IBGC, thus, implicitly 
admitted that the non-disclosure of individual compensation was a reasonable disclosure 
practice.  
Instruction CVM 480 of December 7th 2009 introduced drastic changes in 
disclosure that became mandatory from January 1st 2010. It required firms to present 
detailed annual filings through a document called “Reference Form” (FR, Formulário de 
Referência). The FR brought about many new disclosure demands in its numerous sections 
regarding risk management policies and procedures, internal controls, management and 
discussion analysis (MD&A), and compensation, among many other topics.  
Instruction CVM 480 also required firms to publish the maximum, average and 
minimum compensation paid to BOD and senior management team separately, but not 
on an individual basis. Section 13 of the FR addresses BOD and senior management pay 
compensation. It has 16 items dealing with, among other issues: compensation policy; 
total compensation; variable compensation details, including options and their pricing, as 
well as stock plans; retirement and insurance benefits; and the minimum, maximum, and 
average individual compensation, which is the item under legal dispute. Non-disclosure of 
individual compensation was, once again, admitted, with regulatory strength this time 
around.  
9 
The new pay disclosure rules prompted vigorous reactions from the Brazilian 
corporate establishment. The main argument against them was that the maximum pay 
disclosure singled out the most important person in the company (either the CEO or the 
BOD chair, depending on the company), violated their privacy, and turned them into 
targets for criminals.  
The Brazilian Association of Public Companies (Abrasca, Associação Brasileira das 
Companhias Abertas) is an organization that represents those that command Brazilian 
corporations. It even argued that kidnappers would have greater negotiating power with 
detailed compensation information in their hands (TANOUE, 2010). The Brazilian 
corporate world mirrors the income inequality of the country. Brazilian executives earn 10 
times more than an average professional, while this rate is 4.4 in UK and 4 in the US 
(FONSECA, 2012). Thus, income inequality discourages high pay disclosure because 
companies could also become targets of fiercer pressures from unions and middle-ranked 
employees (TANOUE, 2010).  
The arguments, however, seem weak for several reasons. The marginal impact that 
new information on compensation would have on the personal safety of administrators is 
probably negligible because they already display obvious and explicit signs of wealth in a 
country with large income inequality such as Brazil. The Brazilian press usually discloses 
celebrities’ pay, such as those of TV stars and footballers, with no evidence of greater 
occurrence of kidnappings among them. Finally, crime has diminished substantially in 
Brazil. For example, the state of São Paulo, the richest one and headquarter of many listed 
companies, experienced a decline of 83.1% in the number of kidnappings from 2002 
through 2008.  
About one quarter of Brazilian public companies refused to comply with the new 
rule. They resorted to a preliminary injunction obtained in court by IBEF, which certainly 
has members in most of the relevant listed companies. The preliminary injunction enabled 
companies where IBEF members work to adjourn detailed compensation disclosure. It may 
take years for courts to reach a final decision regarding the IBEF lawsuit.5 In the meantime, 
companies benefiting from the preliminary injunction cite the lawsuit instead of providing 
details about their pay practices in item 13.11 of the FR. 
A few interesting developments after the introduction of Instruction CVM 480 are 
worth mentioning. A top management and BOD compensation proposal was rejected in a 
shareholders meeting for the first time in Brazil in 2011 at PDG, a real estate company 
with dispersed ownership structure6. Glass, Lewis & Co., a US proxy advisory services 
company, recommended a dissenting vote in shareholders meetings for over 50 
companies, mostly as a result of the refusal to inform the maximum, average, and 
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minimum pay values (CARVALHO and TORRES, 2011). Companies started to revise their 
compensation plans based on the information disclosed by other companies, frequently by 
installing compensation committees (FREGONI and TORRES, 2011). Finally, the Brazilian 
Central Bank Resolution 3921 introduced in 2010 mandates that financial institutions 
constitute a compensation committee. It also imposes limits on stock options based 
compensation, deferrals on variable compensation, and claw-back provisions. Articles that 
have summarized recent events in the Brazilian capital markets (not necessarily related to 
compensation disclosure) include Braga-Alves and Shastri, 2011, Leal, 2010, Silveira and 
Saito, 2009, and, Chavez and Silva, 2009, among others.  
Even though Pinto and Leal (2013) did not have the maximum compensation 
figures for management and the BOD, they found evidence that family controlled 
companies pay more to their CEO and BOD when relevant shareholders or their relatives 
are directors for a sample of 315 companies in 2010. It is also important to highlight that 
power and ownership in Brazilian corporations are still quite concentrated (STERNBERG, 
LEAL, and BORTOLON, 2011).  
The highest earners in corporations may be reluctant to publicize how much they 
make for a number of reasons. It is quite possible that safety is a concern, but it is almost 
certainly not the only one, and possibly not the main one. Tax authorities may be another 
concern as well as the risk of legal litigation, such as in labor, family, tax, creditor and 
corporate legal disputes, because those that control corporations may be personally liable 
in many ways7. It is also notorious that many employ legal stratagems to hide personal 
assets, such as placing them in friendly hands, because of potential liabilities8. Disclosing 
their compensation possibly does not provide information that is entirely new, but it places 
a reliable number on what was only inaccurately estimated, particularly in what regards 
variable compensation, supplying legal opponents with better ammunition.  
The controlling shareholders of the largest Brazilian companies can be powerful 
beyond the scope of their businesses. They may be politically connected and influence 
lawmakers and enforcers as well as government controlled financial institutions and those 
deciding about concessions, purchases, and investments. Thus, they may not be financially 
constrained and capital market financing is not their sole or even main source of 
financing.  
 
4 - POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
 
It is reasonable to expect that the quality of corporate governance practices is 
associated with a greater propensity to disclose new mandatory information without 
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resorting to legal stratagems. For example, Schiehll et al. (2013) show that Brazilian 
companies with larger BODs, that employ compensation committees, and are audited by 
big-four auditors are more inclined to voluntarily disclose executive stock options 
programs. Thus, our first hypothesis is:  
 
H1: Non-compliance is more likely for firms with lower quality of corporate 
governance practices, represented by a score of corporate governance 
practices (CGI) or by listing in one of the two most demanding listing levels of 
BM&FBovespa.  
 
Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) assume that firms that rely more on capital markets may 
have stronger incentives to disclosure. 9  Capital market relevance may decrease for 
companies with concentrated control in the hands of influential individuals or with the state 
as part of the controlling coalition because they may have easier access to financing by 
means of government institutions. Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) also conjecture that greater 
ownership concentration leads to lower disclosure because powerful owners could be 
perceived as effective overseers of managers. Finally, if there are potentially relevant costs 
associated with compensation disclosure, such as personal security costs and those related 
to family, tax, creditor or corporate law litigations, influential controlling shareholders 
should find it easier to bypass governance restrictions and impose on the firm their 
unwillingness to comply. Thus, a second testable hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Non-compliance is more likely when the ownership concentration is 
greater, represented by the proportion of the voting and non-voting stocks held 
by the three and five largest shareholders.  
 
 Pinto and Leal (2013) show that Brazilian family controlled firms tend to pay more to 
their CEOs and BOD members when controlling shareholders or their relatives act as 
directors. Schiehll et al. (2013) also assert that family controlled firms tend not to 
voluntarily disclose their executive stock options plans. Therefore, we conjecture that non-
compliance should be more frequent among family-controlled firms. On the other hand, 
we suppose that compliance should be greater among state-owned and foreign-controlled 
companies.  
Two reasons motivate our argument about state-owned companies. First, the 
government appointees who run them indirectly represent the very entity that enacted the 
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norm requiring compliance. Second, top management pay in state-owned companies 
have been historically capped in Brazil to the highest remunerations in the executive 
branch of government.10 As a result, senior management compensation in listed state-
owned companies is lower than in other listed firms according to Pinto and Leal (2013) 
and a 2012 IBGC survey.11  
Many foreign-controlled companies have to comply with similar or more stringent 
regulation on executive pay disclosure in their home countries. They would be less likely to 
spend corporate resources with a legal injunction in order to avoid disclosing information 
that is already public in their home countries. Thus, our third hypothesis on the relation 
between the type of the controlling shareholder and the likelihood of compliance with the 
new norm follows: 
 
H3: Non-compliance is more likely in family controlled firms and less likely in 
state-owned and foreign-controlled companies.  
 
Our broad conjecture is that agency costs are a relevant factor to explain the 
decision to not comply with the new disclosure rules. If this is true, then higher levels of 
compensation paid for top executives and directors may also be associated with the use of 
the court injunction. In Brazil, firms were required, before the enactment of the new rule, to 
disclose the total compensation paid in agreggate to the senior management team and 
the BOD. As a result, we hypothesize that the magnitude of such compensaiton should be 
positively related with the non-compliance decision. This argument is supported Costa et 
al. (2012), who conclude that CEO compensation is positively related with the use of the 
court injunction in the Brazilian market. 
 
H4: Non-compliance is more likely in firms that spend more to compensate their 
senior executives and board members, after controlling for firm size.  
 
Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) hypothesize that financially constrained firms disclose less 
because bad news may worry markets and disclosure costs money. They consider that 
larger and more profitable firms are less constrained. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) 
also conjecture that the compliance cost is significant for smaller firms. Thus, it could be 
that smaller firms are less inclined to comply. However, the average administrator pay in 
the larger Brazilian firms is greater (Pinto and Leal, 2013). It is possible that larger firms 
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are less inclined to comply because of their potentially large agency costs related 
associated with the free cash flow problem. Related testable hypotheses are:  
 
H5: Non-compliance is more likely in more financially constrained firms, 
represented by younger, smaller, and lower ROA firms.  
H6: Non-compliance is more likely in larger firms because they are expected to 
be more prone to incur into agency costs associated with the free cash flow 
problem. 
 
Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) and Aggarwal et al. (2009) argue that external capital 
dependence may lead companies to greater disclosure and better corporate governance 
practices. Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) represent external capital dependence through a 
number of variables, such as leverage, previous performance, and the market-to-book 
ratio. Our seventh hypothesis addresses capital dependence, which is represented by 
similar variables:   
 
H7: Non-compliance is less likely for firms with greater external capital 
dependence, represented by greater leverage and market-to-book ratios.  
 
5 - SAMPLE AND METHOD 
 
5.1  Sample and variable definitions     
We begin with all publicly traded companies listed in BM&FBovespa. A liquidity 
index minimum of 0.01 limited the sample to 214 companies. Roughly, this liquidity index 
value indicates that the company accounts for 0.01% of the total volume traded on the 
exchange 12 . The inclusion of a liquidity constraint is important because many listed 
companies trade lightly and our price impact study depends on daily price availability.  
We analyze data from 2010 filings relative to 2009, the year following the 
introduction of the new regulation when companies used the court injunction to avert 
compliance. The dependent variable assumes the value of "1" when the firm does not 
comply with section 13.11 of the FR and "0" otherwise. The zero score, therefore, indicates 
that firms followed the rule by informing the minimum, average, and maximum 
compensation paid to the senior management team and BOD, separately.  
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Table 1 presents our set of explanatory variables. The Corporate Governance Index 
(CGI) is our main explanatory variable and consists of a score that represents the firm-level 
quality of corporate governance practices of listed Brazilian companies. The CGI score 
consists of objective “yes” (1 point) or “no” (0 points) answers. A partial answer is 
acceptable in a few questions and the score is 0.5 in this case. An affirmative answer 
denotes the presence of a good corporate governance practice. The original CGI was 
developed by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007). We used the company scores relative to 
2009 provided by the IBGC and professors André L. Carvalhal-da-Silva and Ricardo P. C. 
Leal, who hold joint rights of its use.  
The Appendix displays the questionnaire used to obtain the scores employed in our 
article. The questions include only issues that may be verified from publicly available 
information in order to have the largest possible sample and avoid subjectivity. An 
important limitation of such device is that one cannot detect the presence of some 
corporate governance practices from publicly available information and evaluate how well 
a company applies the practices it reports.  
The questionnaire is based on the code of good corporate governance practices 
produced by the IBGC. It reflects adoption of corporate governance practices beyond 
what is legally required in Brazil and not compliance with the law. Thus, it is equivalent in 
spirit to the Adjusted CG Index computed by Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), which 
reflected firm-level corporate governance adjusted for country-level governance 
requirements in a multi-country sample. The use of such scores is common in the 
literature. Other examples include Berglöf and Pajuste (2005), who use one for Central 
and Eastern European countries, and Ammann et al. (2011) and Aggarwal et al. (2009) 
for multi country samples.  
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Table 1 – Variable Definitions  - The table describes the variables used in this study. The data 
source is Economatica, except where noted. 




Non-comply – assumes the value of "1" if the firm does not comply with the 
Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM – Comissão de Valores Mobiliários) 
regulation to report compensation in section 13.11 of the Reference Form (Brazil’s 
official annual filing); "0" otherwise. This variable was computed by the authors 





CGI – Corporate Governance Index of practices with a set of 20 questions, based 
on that created by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007); points are attributed when 
a good corporate governance practice is present ("1" or "0.5", depending on the 
question). Scores range from 0 to 20. The source is the annual scoring performed 
on behalf of the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute under the supervision of 
Profs. André L. Carvalhal-da-Silva and Ricardo P. C. Leal. Used with permission. 
NM – is assigned "1" when the company is listed in the Novo Mercado segment 
and "0" otherwise. 
N2NM – is assigned "1" when the company is listed in the Level 2 or Novo 
Mercado segments and "0" otherwise. 
Identity of the 
Controlling 
Shareholder 
Family – "1" for companies controlled by individuals or families; "0" otherwise. 
Control exists when a shareholder has 50% or more of the votes.  
State – "1" for companies controlled by the state; "0" otherwise.  
Foreign – "1" for companies controlled by foreign entities such as multinationals; 
"0" otherwise.  
Shared – "1" for companies controlled by a pool of shareholders involving at least 
one individual and one company or institution (such as institutional investors) 
acting in concert; "0" otherwise. 
Dispersed – "1" for companies with widely held shareholding structure in which the 
largest shareholder holds less than 10% of voting shares; "0" otherwise. 
Ownership 
Concentration 
3Largest – aggregate percentage of total shares (both voting and non-voting) held 
by the three largest shareholders. 
Compensation Total Compensation – Total compensation paid to the senior management team 
and the board of directors in aggregate, expressed in Brazilian reais. 
Firm Size Ln of Total Assets – Natural logarithm of total assets, expressed in thousands of 
Brazilian reais. 
Firm Age Age – Natural logarithm of the number of years since company foundation.  
Profitability ROA – percent return on assets at the end of 2009. ROA is computed as {net 
income + [interest expense on debt-interest capitalized × (1 – tax rate)]} / last 
year’s total assets. 
Relative 
market value 
P/E – price-earnings ratio (firm’s share price divided by the most recent earnings 
per share) at the end of 2009. 
P/B – price-to-book ratio (firm’s share price divided by the book value of its equity 
per share) ratio at the end of 2009. 
Financial 
leverage  
Gross debt / total assets – (short term debt and current portion of long term debt 
+ long term debt) / total assets. We do not compute this variable for banks. 




Daily abnormal returns (AR) are computed alternatively as  
(“market excess” method), where  is the stock return of firm  in day  and 
 is the day  return of the Ibovespa index or as 
 (“market model” method). The parameters  and 
 are estimated using 99 daily returns beginning 109 days and ending 11 days 
before the event day. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are computed by summing ARs over 
alternative event windows. 
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An alternative operational definition for the firm-level corporate governance quality 
is a dummy for listing in one of BM&FBovespa premium listing segments. These segments 
were created at the end of 2000. Companies listed in the traditional listing segment, the 
only one up to that point, can migrate to a new listing level if they sign a contract with 
BM&FBovespa committing to meet its requirements. Companies that go public to list at 
BM&FBovespa opt for one of the listing levels. The premium-listing levels do not have 
requirements regarding the disclosure of management and BOD compensation and, as 
such, companies listed in those segments may decide not to comply with the new 
compensation disclosure regulation and still fulfill their premium listing level 
commitments.13  
The set of ownership variables presented in Table 1 contains dummy variables to 
indicate when the controlling shareholder is a family, the state, or a foreign entity. Control 
is attained when a shareholder owns 50 percent or more of the votes. Brazilian voting 
shares may have only one vote per share, multiple vote shares are not allowed by the law. 
Companies controlled by institutional investors, such as private equity or pension funds, or 
by a pool of shareholders involving, at least, one individual and one company or 
institution, acting in concert, are classified under “shared control”. Companies are 
classified as “Dispersed” if there is no shareholder with more than 10% of the voting 
shares. Two additional variables are the sum of the percentage holdings of voting and 
non-voting shares of the three and five largest shareholders. Ownership information and 
the identity of the main shareholders were hand collected from the FR.  
Our set of variables also includes: proxies for company size (natural logarithm of 
total assets or of operational revenues by the end of 2009); profitability measures (the 
returns on equity and on assets); relative value ratios (price-earnings and price-to-book 
ratios); a leverage measure (total debt relative to total assets ratio); and the age of the 
company. Financial data come from the Economatica® database.  
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for our sample according to compliance to the 
new regulation. Panel A depicts the CGI, dummies for listing on BM&FBovespa premium 
segments, and ownership concentration measures. Non-complying firms display 
significantly lower CGI scores. Forty percent of the non-complying firms belong to the two 
most demanding premium-listing segments of the exchange while 32 percent are listed on 
Novo Mercado, the most demanding premium segment. The ownership structure is 
significantly more concentrated among non-complying firms. Overall, Panel A of Table 2 
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suggests that non-complying firms score lower in corporate governance practices and 
display greater ownership concentration.  
Panel B of Table 2 focuses on the identity of the largest shareholder. Individuals or 
families own most firms in the sample (47 percent) and an even larger proportion of non-
complying firms (55 percent). The difference between these proportions, however, for 
complying and non-complying firms is not statistically significant. State-owned and widely 
held firms are significantly fewer among non-complying firms.  
There are no significant differences between complying and non-complying firms 
regarding some of the selected general characteristics of the sample conveyed by the 
variables portrayed in Panel C of Table 2. The exception is a greater median ROA for 
complying firms, which is consistent with the financial constraint and the pay and 
performance disconnection hypotheses (BEBCHUK and FRIED, 2003; BERGLÖF and 
PAJUSTE, 2005). The average asset size was BRL 2.26 billion (about USD 1.13 billion in 
December of 2009).  
The median total debt to asset ratio was 25.56 percent, while the median ROA and 
ROE were 4.01 and 14.30 percent, respectively. We did not include the debt ratios for the 
17 banks in the sample. Thus, we excluded banks when we estimate models including the 
leverage proxy. The median firm was 36 years old, but the sample comprises both newly 
created firms as well as centenary firms such as the 202 years old state-owned Banco do 
Brasil, the largest bank in Brazil at the time. The median market multiples by the end of 
2009 were 13.32 for the P/E ratio and 1.85 for the price-to-book ratio. Average trading 
volume was not different between the two groups and we do not show statistics for this 
variable. The presence of some outliers is very clear among the variables in Table 2.  
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
The table shows descriptive statistics according to compliance to section 13.11 of the Reference Form, the 
new regulation. Table 1 contains all variable definitions. “*” indicates significance at the five percent level. 
"N/A" means "not applicable". The t-statistics refers to the non-compliance ("1") minus the compliance ("0") 
sample mean differences. The χ2 statistics tests that the two samples come from populations with the same 
median. The t-test for "Lev" was repeated without the maximum observation (7155.05). The average "Lev" 
was 25.59 for the complying group, still with no significance for the difference.  
Panel A: Corporate governance index, premium listing dummies, and ownership concentration 
 CGI NM N2NM 3Largest 5Largest 
Comply=No      
Mean 11.38 0.32 0.40 61.41 66.07 
Median 11.50 0.00 0.00 60.70 68.28 
St. Deviation 3.77 0.47 0.49 19.90 18.56 
Minimum 3.50 0.00 0.00 27.01 31.57 
Maximum 17.00 1.00 1.00 99.35 99.64 
No. Obs. 60 60 60 60 60 
Comply=Yes      
Mean 13.80 0.58 0.66 54.23 59.46 
Median 14.50 1.00 1.00 53.78 62.44 
St. Deviation 3.08 0.49 0.47 22.05 21.26 
Minimum 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.37 4.37 
Maximum 19.00 1.00 1.00 100.00 100.00 
No. Obs. 154 154 154 154 154 
t-statistic -4.41* -3.69* -3.53* 2.29* 2.24* 
χ2 8.55* N/A N/A 1.48 0.37 
Comply=Both      
Mean 13.12 0.51 0.59 56.24 61.32 
Median 14.00 1.00 1.00 55.35 63.01 
St. Deviation 3.45 0.50 0.49 21.67 20.71 
Minimum 3.50 0.00 0.00 4.37 4.37 
Maximum 19.00 1.00 1.00 100.00 100.00 
No. Obs. 214 214 214 214 214 
 
Panel B: Identity of Largest Shareholder 
 Family State Foreign Shared Dispersed 
Comply=No      
Mean 0.55 0.02 0.10 0.32 0.02 
Median 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
St. Deviation 0.50 0.13 0.30 0.47 0.13 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
No. Obs. 60 60 60 60 60 
Comply=Yes      
Mean 0.44 0.09 0.08 0.28 0.11 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
St. Deviation 0.50 0.29 0.28 0.45 0.31 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
No. Obs. 154 154 154 154 154 
t-statistic 1.51 -2.60* 0.35 0.53 -3.09* 




Panel C: Other Variables 
 LnAssets Lev ROA ROE P/E P/B Age 
Comply=No        
Mean 14.95 27.84 0.98 20.50 15.58 3.69 42.40 
Median 14.89 22.90 2.37 10.49 13.17 1.87 33.00 
St. Deviation 2.27 18.05 16.41 49.92 105.10 6.26 33.84 
Minimum 8.44 0.00 -97.69 -45.47 -481.77 -0.24 0.00 
Maximum 20.23 61.06 51.58 300.89 577.06 29.66 113.00 
No. Obs. 60 57 59 52 57 58 60 
Comply=Yes        
Mean 14.65 76.51 0.30 20.87 55.89 2.70 39.15 
Median 14.52 25.65 4.78 14.78 13.35 1.85 36.50 
St. Deviation 1.69 602.84 62.64 59.32 427.49 9.00 31.31 
Minimum 7.66 0.00 -756.79 -98.68 -155.65 -50.54 2.00 
Maximum 20.38 7155.05 61.26 647.63 5103.58 85.34 202.00 
No. Obs. 153 140 153 144 143 143 154 
t-statistic 0.91 -0.95 0.12 -0.04 -1.05 0.89 0.64 
χ2 0.92 0.18 3.97* 0.94 0.02 0.00 0.05 
Comply=Both        
Mean 14.74 62.43 0.49 20.77 44.40 2.99 40.06 
Median 14.63 25.56 4.01 14.30 13.32 1.85 36.00 
St. Deviation 1.87 508.24 53.86 56.85 365.85 8.30 31.99 
Minimum 7.66 0.00 -756.79 -98.68 -481.77 -50.54 0.00 
Maximum 20.38 7155.05 61.26 647.63 51003.58 85.34 202.00 
No. Obs. 213 197 212 196 200 201 214 
 
 
We employed the Economatica database industry classification comprised of twenty 
categories. Industry representation in the sample of 214 firms includes more firms in the 
electricity, finance and insurance, building, textiles, and steel industries. No industry 
contains more than ten percent of the firms in the sample, with the exception of the "other" 
classification.  Industry level statistics are not presented for the sake of brevity but are 
available upon request. Compliance was higher in the oil and gas, building, finance and 
insurance, electric and electronics, and food and beverage industries, and lower in the 
paper and pulp and software industries.  
The correlation matrix among selected variables presented in Table 3 confirms the 
significant association between compliance with the regulation, CGI score, Novo Mercado 
dummy, and state control. Naturally, firms with higher CGI scores tend to be listed in 
Novo Mercado, as these variables are proxies for the same concept. Family and foreign-
Comply=Both      
Mean 0.47 0.07 0.09 0.29 0.08 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
St. Deviation 0.50 0.26 0.29 0.45 0.28 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
No. Obs. 214 214 214 214 214 
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controlled companies are associated with lower CGI scores, probably for very different 
reasons, as foreign-controlled companies may often be little more than fully owned 
subsidiaries of larger parent companies headquartered in economies with developed 
capital markets where financing may be cheaper and more abundant. As such, they may 
not see an advantage to practice the same corporate governance standards as in their 
home country, as preconized by Aggarwal et al. (2009). Among the remaining variables, 
some usual relationships emerge, such as greater leverage, ROA and trading volume for 
larger firms.  
 
Table 3 – Correlations between selected variables 
The table displays Pearson correlation coefficients. Table 1 contains all variable definitions. “*” indicates 
significance at the five percent level.  
 Comply CGI NM Family State Foreign Shared 
CGI 0.3144* – – – – – – 





– – – – 











-0.0857 – – 
Shared -0.0371 0.1483* 0.1941* -
0.5982* 
-0.1753* -0.1994* – 
Dispersed 0.1517* 0.2924* 0.2638* -
0.2838* 
-0.0832 -0.0946 -0.1935* 
        
 Comply LnAssets Lev ROA ROE P/E  
LnAssets -0.0710 – – – – –  
Lev -0.0505 0.0277 – – – –  
ROA -0.0057 0.2894* -
0.9717* 
– – –  
ROE 0.0029 -0.0629 -
0.1732* 
0.5425* – –  
P/E 0.0499 0.0722 -0.0130 0.0046 -0.0275 –  
P/B -0.0543 -0.0222 -0.0293 0.0942 0.8944* 0.0359  
 
 
6 - DETERMINANTS OF THE NON-COMPLIANCE DECISION 
 
Based on our hypotheses, we model the decision not to comply with section 13.11 of 
Instruction 480 as a function of the: quality or firm-level corporate governance; 
concentration of ownership structure; identity of the controlling shareholder; firm size; firm 
age; financial leverage; profitability; relative market value; and industry affiliation. Proxies 
for these potential determinants are included in the vector  shown in equation (1) below: 
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                                                   (1) 
where  is an indicator variable, so that  if firm  has failed 
to comply with section 13.11 of Instruction 480.  
Table 4 presents five variations of the model described above. Model A is the 
baseline regression. The first column of Table 4 shows that the CGI score is negatively and 
significantly related to the non-complying decision. Therefore, better-governed 
corporations appear to be less likely to exercise their option of not complying via the legal 
injunction. The coefficient estimate for the CGI score in Model A implies that a firm with a 
score equal to 3.5 (our sample minimum) is expected to be 7.4 times more likely to fail to 
comply with the regulation than a similar firm with a CGI score equal to 19 (our sample 
maximum)14. 
Models B and C replace the CGI score with dummies that assume a value of 1 for 
companies that voluntarily joined Novo Mercado or Level 2, the two most demanding 
stock exchange premium listing segments in terms of disclosure and other corporate 
governance practices. The results are similar, suggesting that firms with better governance 
practices are less prone to fail to comply with the new requirements on compensation 
disclosure. Specifically, the coefficient estimate for N2NM in Model C implies that a firm 
that is not listed on either Novo Mercado or Level 2 is expected to be 2.31 times more 
likely not to comply than a similar firm that is listed in one of these segments. It is 
important to note that none of the premium-listing segments include among their demands 
a detailed disclosure of compensation such as the one required by Instruction CVM 480. 
Models D and E are similar to Models A and C, excluding the leverage variable, for which 
we had fewer observations because we do not compute leverage for banks. The results 
remain essentially unchanged, corroborating our Hypothesis 1 that non-compliance is 
significantly more likely for firms with lower quality of corporate governance. 
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Table  4 – Determinants of the non-compliance decision  
Probit regressions to test the corporate attributes associated with the decision not to comply with CVM 
(Brazilian Securities Commission) Instruction 480 by disclosing the maximum, average and minimum 
individual compensation paid to the board of directors and the management team as a body in section 
13.11 of the Reference Form (Brazil’s official annual filing). The dependent variable is “Non-comply”, the 
dummy indicating non-compliance (“1”) or compliance (“0”) with the new regulation. Table 1 contains the 
definitions of all variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
 Dependent Variable: Non-compliance with section 13.11 of Reference Form 
      
CGI  -0.1673***   -0.2263***  
 (-4.1075)   (-4.8078)  
NM   -0.6256**    
  (-2.2347)    
N2NM    -0.9876***  -0.9247*** 
   (-3.4059)  (-3.4835) 
3Largest 0.0252*** 0.0226*** 0.0227*** 0.0334*** 0.0148** 
 (3.6327) (3.4021) (3.3100) (4.0784) (2.5740) 
Family  0.0198 -0.0594 -0.0222 -0.2423 0.0776 
 (0.0672) (-0.2031) (-0.0745) (-0.7349) (0.2833) 
State  -1.4436* -1.5163** -1.8175** -1.7273* -1.5908** 
 (-1.8911) (-2.1655) (-2.4939) (-1.9267) (-2.4622) 
Foreign  -1.0966** -0.9276* -1.1165** -2.0619** -0.7345 
 (-2.0259) (-1.8541) (-2.1979) (-3.1002) (-1.4880) 
Dispersed -0.2829 -0.5852 -0.4994 -0.3692 -0.7055 
 (-0.3879) (-0.8899) (-0.7531) (-0.5508) (-1.1655) 
Shared  
dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped 
 
Total Compensation    0.4733**  
    (2.4621)  
Ln of Total Assets 0.2637*** 0.1868** 0.1978** 0.3286** 0.1796** 
 (2.8210) (2.0857) (2.2362) (2.5728) (2.1528) 
Age 0.0050 0.0069 0.0056 0.0057 0.0022 
 (0.8704) (1.3323) (1.0230) (0.9892) (0.4402) 
Gross debt / total assets 0.0005 0.0012 0.0009   
 (0.0616) (0.1653) (0.1216)   
ROA -0.0320*** -0.0362*** -0.0347*** -0.0019 0.0002 
 (-2.8793) (-3.0529) (-2.9012) (-1.0822) (0.1129) 
P/B 0.0129 0.0109 0.0094 -0.0008 -0.0014 
 (1.0976) (0.9637) (0.8582) (-0.0667) (-0.1371) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -3.3762** -3.9874*** -3.8992*** -12.2326*** -3.2951** 
 (-2.3193) (-2.8276) (-2.8219) (-4.0473) (-2.4645) 
Number of observations 176 176 176 166 197 
Pseudo R-squared 0.322 0.268 0.291 0.385 0.241 
Chi2 61.10 52.54 54.24 71.77 51.10 
Chi2 (p-value) < 0.001 0.00332 0.00209 < 0.001 0.00486 
 
We include only the ownership concentration for the three largest shareholders in the 
models reported in Table 4 because there is obviously a high correlation between the 
percentage of shares held by the three and five largest shareholders. Ownership 
23 
concentration is negatively and significantly associated with the decision to disclose 
compensation in all models. The coefficient for this variable in Model A suggests that a 
firm increasing its ownership concentration from the sample median value of 55.35% to 
the sample maximum of 100% would become approximately twice as likely not to comply 
with the disclosure regulation. Overall, we find support for our Hypothesis 2 that non-
compliance is likelier when ownership concentration is greater. 
The analysis of the effect of the identity of the controlling shareholder indicates that 
state and foreign ownership are significantly associated with a lower likelihood of non-
compliance. The magnitude of their coefficient estimates in Model A suggests that the 
likelihood of non-compliance is expected to be over four times lower for a state-owned 
firm and over two and a half times lower for a foreign-controlled firm compared, in both 
cases, to an otherwise identical family-controlled firm. The inference is similar if we use 
shared or dispersed control as the comparison group. The coefficient estimates for our 
family control dummy are not significantly different from zero, which means that the 
likelihood of non-compliance for family firms does not significantly differ from that of 
shared-control firms, which is the excluded category. Therefore, we find partial support for 
Hypothesis 3 because non-compliance is significantly less likely for both state-owned and 
foreign-controlled firms but it is not distinctly more likely for family controlled firms. 
Hypothesis 4 states that companies that display larger compensation to the board of 
directors and top management are more inclined not to comply. Model D in Table 4 
shows that this relationship was significant and indicates support for the hypothesis. We 
also find mixed support for Hypothesis 5, which states that non-compliance should be 
more likely for more financially constrained firms, represented by younger and smaller 
firms, as well as by those with lower profitability. In line with this prediction, non-
compliance seems indeed more likely for companies with lower profitability ratios, 
although the significance of the estimates is sensitive to the specification of the model. 
However, firm age does not seem to be associated with the compliance decision. 
Moreover, larger companies are significantly less likely to comply, which means that, 
contrary to Hypothesis 5, non-compliance is less likely for smaller firms. This result is 
compatible with our Hypothesis 6, whose rationale is that BOD members and senior 
managers in larger companies are more hostile to the idea of accepting the new 
regulation because these companies usually grant their administrators larger 
compensation packages. 
Finally, we do not find evidence that supports Hypothesis 7 that non-compliance 
should be less likely for firms with greater external capital dependence because the 
estimates for the proxies for financial leverage and relative market value are non-
significant in all regressions. 
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Summing up, companies with lower corporate governance scores, greater ownership 
concentration, larger, and with lower profitability ratios are more inclined not to comply 
with the new regulation requiring disclosure of details about the compensation of their 
senior management and BOD. In contrast, companies controlled by foreigners or by the 
state are more likely to comply. 
 
6.1 Crime rates and robustness checks 
We run a battery of regressions to check whether crime rates in the state where the 
company’s headquarters is located could also predict the decision to not comply with 
disclosure regulation. Costa et al. (2012) raised this issue and conclude that local crime 
rates, particularly robbery rates, are positively associated with the use of IBEF’s court 
injunction in Brazil. We start by using the same data as Costa et al. (2012) from 2009. In 
this case, we initially observe mixed results: homicide and robbery followed by homicide 
rates were not related to the non-compliance decision whereas car theft and total robbery 
rates seem to be positively associated with the use of the court injunction (in this case, in 
line with the results in COSTA et al., 2012). 
After carefully analyzing the data, though, we identified a clear outlier: Minas 
Gerais, the second most populous state of Brazil, reported robbery rates much lower than 
in other areas. In fact, the significance of the coefficients for car theft and total robbery 
rates were entirely due to the inclusion of this outlier. We researched this puzzling issue 
further and found new security data for Minas Gerais state in the 2011 and 2012 editions 
of the Brazilian Yearbook of Public Safety. According to this official publication from the 
Brazilian Government, the crime rates previously attributed to Minas Gerais in 2009 were 
wrong and underestimated by a factor of 15. Finally, by using the new and more accurate 
data from 2012, we observe that there is no statistical association between any of the 
local crime rate variables and the non-compliance decision. Table 5 shows these 
regressions.  
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Table 5 – Crime rates and the non-compliance decision 
Probit regressions including state-level crime rates as potential determinants of the decision not to comply 
with CVM (Brazilian Securities Commission) Instruction 480 by disclosing the maximum, average and 
minimum individual compensation paid to the board of directors and the management team as a body in 
section 13.11 of the Reference Form (Brazil’s official annual filing). The dependent variable is “Non-
comply”, the dummy indicating non-compliance (“1”) or compliance (“0”) with the new regulation. Crime 
variables are provided per 100 thousand inhabitants by the 2011 and 2012 editions of the Brazilian 
Yearbook of Public Safety. Table 1 contains the definitions of all variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust z-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 
Dependent Variable: Non-compliance with section 13.11 of 
Reference Form 
Robbery rate 0.0007   
 (1.2255)   
Robbery  followed by homicide rate  -0.0661  
  (-0.3430)  
Homicide rate   -0.0052 
   (-0.3460) 
CGI -0.1843*** -0.1856*** -0.1847*** 
 (-4.5155) (-4.7432) (-4.6529) 
3Largest 0.0207*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 
 (3.2057) (3.2073) (3.1932) 
Family  0.1221 0.1056 0.1032 
 (0.4207) (0.3701) (0.3614) 
State  -1.0330 -1.2167 -1.2483* 
 (-1.2618) (-1.6124) (-1.7738) 
Foreign  -1.1439** -0.9125* -0.9102* 
 (-2.1862) (-1.8485) (-1.8371) 
Dispersed -0.3839 -0.3507 -0.3559 
 (-0.5924) (-0.5436) (-0.5554) 
Shared dropped dropped dropped 
Ln of Total Assets 0.2648*** 0.2509*** 0.2529*** 
 (3.1590) (3.0308) (3.0949) 
Age -0.0001 0.0015 0.0013 
 (-0.0194) (0.2762) (0.2457) 
ROA 0.0012 0.0012 0.0010 
 (0.8381) (0.7823) (0.6960) 
P/B 0.0059 0.0045 0.0050 
 (0.5678) (0.4278) (0.4820) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Constant -3.2596** -2.6638** -2.6706** 
 (-2.3676) (-2.0228) (-2.0461) 
Number of observations 187 197 197 
Chi2 69.75 71.66 69.86 
Chi2 (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
 
As further robustness checks we run regressions (omitted in the interest of space) 
with alternative operational definitions of some variables. Specifically, we replace: i) the 
equity stake held by the three largest shareholders (our main variable of ownership 
concentration) for the equity stake held by the five largest shareholders; ii) the return on 
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assets (proxy for profitability) for the return on equity; iii) the price-to-book ratio (proxy for 
relative market value) for the price-to-earnings ratio; iv) the total debt over total assets 
(proxy for financial leverage) for the net debt over equity. In all these cases, the main 
results remain essentially unchanged. 
 
7 - NON-COMPLIANCE AND SHARE PRICES 
 
We run two event studies to address the share price impact associated with non-
compliance. Firstly, we investigate if the non-complying propensity of weaker CG firms was 
anticipated by market participants and reflected in share price revisions around the date 
when a higher court confirmed the injunction. Secondly, we investigate the conjecture that 
investors were negatively surprised by non-compliance by firms that supposedly displayed 
better CG practices.  
 
7.1  Share-prices around the injunction confirmation  
We investigate the behavior of share prices around the date when Brazilian firms 
were effectively granted the option not to comply with the compensation disclosure 
regulation. This event happened when Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ), the highest court 
of appeals for non-constitutional matters in Brazil, confirmed the preliminary injunction 
petitioned by IBEF, dismissing the regulator's (CVM) appeal. Any firm could choose not to 
comply from that moment until there is a final judicial decision on the case, which can 
take longer than a decade. In this setting, we are able to check if investors correctly 
anticipated which firms would later use the option and if they perceived it as bad news. In 
particular, we check if investors anticipated that firms with lower CG quality were more 
likely to shun their compensation disclosure.  
STJ confirmed the injunction on April 13th, 2010. Curiously, however, media 
coverage of this decision was sparse for the following couple of days. Only on April 16th 
did the major business newspapers publicize it (for example, the largest circulation 
business newspaper, Valor Econômico). Thus, it is plausible that we observe price 
reactions, if any, spread over a few days following April 13th. To account for the media 
coverage delay, we compute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for a set of alternative 
event windows, encompassing the period from April 13th (‘day 0’) through April 17th (‘day 
+4’). Daily abnormal returns (AR) are computed using the market excess method and the 
market model method, as described in the Appendix. We estimate Equation 2 after 
computing the CARs for each event window, where CARi is the cumulative abnormal return 
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of firm i, CGi is a proxy for CG quality and the NonComplyi dummy indicates whether firm 
i would eventually use the option not to comply.  
 
    (2) 
Our proxies for CG quality yield strongly positive and significant coefficient 
estimates in all specifications in Panel A of Table 6, suggesting that shareholders 
anticipated that poorly governed firms were more likely to become non-compliers and that 
non-compliance was perceived as a value-destroying event. The effect is also 
economically significant. For example, the coefficient estimates shown in Column A of 
Table 6, Panel A, imply that a hypothetical decrease in the CGI score from its sample 
maximum of 19 to its sample minimum of 3.5 would lead to a 6.37 p.p. decrease in 
expected CAR during the event window, all else equal. Analogously, the estimates shown 
in Column F of Table 6, Panel A, imply that, all else equal, the expected CAR during the 
event window is 1.9 p.p. lower for firms that are not listed in Novo Mercado. Consistent 
with the media coverage delay noted earlier, the coefficient estimates are substantially 




Table 6 – Share-prices around the injunction confirmation 
Panel A shows the results of OLS regressions examining abnormal returns around the date when Brazil’s 
highest court of appeal (STJ) confirmed the preliminary injunction filed by IBEF, which effectively granted 
firms the option not to comply with the compensation disclosure regulation (section 13.11 of the Reference 
Form, Brazil’s official annual filing, according to CVM Instruction 480). The court decision dates from April 
13th, 2010 (‘day 0’), but media coverage peaked only on April 16th (‘day +3’). The dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return, CAR (for example, CAR (0 +4) represents the CAR from ‘day 0’ to ‘day +4’). 
Panel B shows the results of OLS ‘placebo’ regressions examining abnormal returns around two ‘non-event’ 
days, i.e., days when no relevant market-wide governance-related news was released. CAR (-12 -11) and 
CAR (-2 -1)  represent the cumulative abnormal return from ‘day -12’ to ‘day -11’ and from ‘day -2’ to ‘day 
-1’, respectively (‘day 0’ is April 13th, 2010). CARs are computed using the market excess method and the 
market model method. The Appendix contains the definitions of all variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A – Market reaction around the date when a higher court confirmed the injunction  
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 CAR (0 +1) CAR (0 +4) CAR (0 +1) CAR (0 +4) CAR (0 +1) CAR (0 +4) 
 Market  
Model 
Market Model Market Excess Market Excess Market  
Model 
Market Model 
       
CGI 0.0017*** 0.0041*** 0.0016*** 0.0030***   
 (4.1529) (3.8925) (3.9434) (3.0005)   
NM     0.0068** 0.0190*** 
     (2.0737) (3.2982) 
Non-comply 0.0007 0.0003 0.0019 0.0006 -0.0021 -0.0056 
 (0.2184) (0.0513) (0.5407) (0.0918) (-0.6280) (-0.9129) 
Constant -0.0214*** -0.0536*** -0.0218*** -0.0281* -0.0013 -0.0078 
 (-3.6346) (-3.3829) (-3.7822) (-1.8547) (-0.4741) (-1.4930) 
No. obs. 199 199 199 199 199 199 
R2 0.0675 0.1226 0.0587 0.0673 0.0269 0.0664 
F 9.654 9.818 8.376 5.612 2.823 7.311 
F (p-value) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.0043 0.0619 < 0.001 
 
Panel B – Placebo regressions: abnormal returns around selected “non-event” days  
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 CAR (-12 -11) CAR (-2 -1) CAR (-12 -11) CAR (-2 -1) CAR (-12 -11) CAR (-2 -1) 
 Market  
Model 
Market Model Market Excess Market Excess Market  
Model 
Market Model 
       
CGI -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0006   
 (-0.3151) (-0.0255) (-0.7854) (-1.0350)   
NM     -0.0065* 0.0047 
     (-1.8671) (1.3762) 
Non-comply 0.0053 -0.0053 0.0058 -0.0057 0.0043 -0.0041 
 (1.2710) (-1.3868) (1.3502) (-1.4958) (0.9430) (-1.0758) 
Constant -0.0030 0.0032 0.0034 0.0190** -0.0020 0.0003 
 (-0.3185) (0.3768) (0.3570) (2.1893) (-0.6939) (0.1165) 
No. obs. 199 199 199 199 199 199 
R2 0.0112 0.0105 0.0185 0.0134 0.0260 0.0204 
F 0.830 1.033 1.180 1.333 2.175 2.196 
F (p-value) 0.4376 0.3579 0.3096 0.2662 0.1164 0.1140 
 
Panel A of Table 6 displays the non-significance of the coefficient estimates for the 
NonComply dummy. This is another relevant result that suggests that market participants 
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did not fully anticipate which firms would fail to comply, e.g., firms with relatively high CGI 
score or listed in Novo Mercado that would eventually use the injunction.  
The main concern with this event study is the possibility that our estimates are 
simply picking up a positive trend in returns for good CG firms or some other confounding 
effect coinciding with the event period. To address these issues, we first search for other 
relevant, market-wide, CG-related news in the business media during our event windows 
and find none. Second, we run several “placebo tests” to check if good CG firms had a 
positive trend in returns prior to the confirmation of the injunction. For instance, in Table 6, 
Panel B, we estimate regressions using CARs computed over two “non-event” windows 
before April 13th, 2010, i.e., encompassing days when no relevant market-wide CG-
related news was released (for example, the window encompassing the two trading days 
immediately before April 13th, 2010). As shown in Table 6, Panel B, none of our CG 
proxies remain positive and significant when we use these windows (in some specifications, 
their signs actually flip from positive to negative), suggesting that our results are driven by 
the CG-related innovation conveyed by the decision of the court of appeals.  
 
7.2  Share-prices around the announcement of the non-compliance decision 
As noted above, some firms with high CGI scores and listed in Novo Mercado used 
the injunction to avoid full disclosure of their managerial compensation (indeed, 32 
percent of non-compliers were listed in Novo Mercado). Thus, it seems plausible that, by 
using the injunction, these firms negatively surprised their minority shareholders. To 
investigate this conjecture, we look at share price revisions around the date when investors 
became aware of each firm’s decision.  
We begin by surveying company announcements and the Brazilian business media 
to find the exact date when each firm made public its decision not to comply with the 
compensation disclosure regulation. We check three possibilities: (1) when the first 
shareholders’ meeting is summoned and the agenda includes the executive compensation 
plan; (2) when the FR is published in the CVM website; and (3) when news regarding the 
non-compliance of the firm is published in Valor Econômico. 
The non-compliance event date coincided with the day when the firm filed its FR 
with the compensation information missing in approximately 95% of the cases in our 
sample. Therefore, in these cases, the non-compliance date coincides with the disclosure 
of other potentially relevant corporate information, such as dividend policy, financial 
statements, risk management policies, and much more because the FR encompasses a 
wide variety of company information, including its financial statements.  
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After identifying the event date (‘day 0’), we compute CARs from ‘day 0’ to ‘day 
+1’. Correspondingly, we also compute CARs for the complying firms around the day of 
their FR filing containing the required compensation disclosure. Thus, we are able to 
contrast share price changes for complying and non-complying firms around the 
disclosure of their FR. The estimates shown in Table 7 are based on Equation 3, where 
NonComplyi ×CGi is the interaction of the proxy for CG quality (CGi) and the NonComplyi 
dummy.  
  (3) 
 
Consistent with our conjecture, columns A through D in Table 7 show a negative 
and statistically significant interaction coefficient (although only at the 10% level in some 
cases). Interestingly, the interaction estimates, though still negative, become smaller and 
are no longer statistically different from zero when we use NMN2 as the CG proxy. This 
result, shown in columns E and F in Table 7 is unsurprising, however, since the CG 
provisions of Level 2 segment are less demanding than those of the Novo Mercado 
segment (correspondingly, the mean CGI score is substantially lower for Level 2 firms 
compared with Novo Mercado firms).  
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Table 7 – Share-prices around the non-compliance decision announcement  
The Table shows results from OLS regressions examining abnormal returns around the date when each firm 
made public its decision not to comply with the compensation disclosure regulation (section 13.11 of the 
Reference Form, Brazil's official annual filing, according to CVM Instruction 480). The dependent variable is 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) using the event window from ‘day 0’ (event date) to ‘day +1’. CARs 
are computed using the market excess method and the market model method. The Appendix contains the 
definitions of all variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 CAR (0 
+1) 
CAR (0 +1) CAR (0 +1) CAR (0 +1) CAR (0 +1) CAR (0 +1) 












       
Non-comply 0.0232 0.0389** 0.0017 0.0056 -0.0009 0.0048 
 (1.4342) (2.0506) (0.3474) (0.9631) (-0.1620) (0.7517) 
CGI 0.0003 0.0014**     
 (0.9780) (1.9813)     
Non-comply  CGI -0.0024* -0.0032**     
 (-1.8373) (-2.1199)     
NM   0.0018 0.0007   
   (0.7765) (0.1474)   
Non-comply  NM   -0.0187** -0.0187*   
   (-2.2002) (-1.8728)   
N2NM     0.0023 0.0036 
     (0.9789) (0.8001) 
Non-comply  N2NM     -0.0083 -0.0111 
     (-0.9932) (-1.1424) 
Constant -0.0032 -0.0197** 0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0033 
 (-0.6513) (-2.1199) (0.2164) (-0.4129) (-0.0513) (-0.9813) 
No. obs. 202 202 202 202 178 178 
R2 0.0532 0.0296 0.0591 0.0236 0.0213 0.0072 
F 1.948 1.934 2.083 1.380 0.915 0.466 
F (p-value) 0.1231 0.1253 0.1037 0.2499 0.4348 0.7065 
 
 
The estimates in Table 7, Column A, imply that, all else equal, a hypothetical 
increase in the CGI score from 3.5 to 19 is associated with a 3.16 p.p. decrease in 
expected CAR if the firm is a non-complier. Analogously, using the estimates in Table 7, 
Column C, we infer that, for non-complying firms, entering the Novo Mercado segment is 
associated with a 1.69 p.p. decrease in expected CAR during the event window. An 
important caveat applies to these inferences, however. Since almost all actual non-
compliance/compliance events coincide with the filing of the FR, our inferences might be 
contaminated by the effect of other unexpected price-relevant information contained in the 
FR (to the extent that this effect is systematically different for complying and non-complying 
firms). Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to adequately control for such 
confounding effects. Finally, we note that using other event windows yield much weaker 
and usually non-significant estimates.  
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8 - CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This article analyzed the case of an overt non-compliance with compensation 
disclosure regulations by means of a court injunction. The event resulted from new 
regulation passed in 2009 in Brazil, a market where ownership concentration is very high 
and new premium listing segments as well as other self-regulatory corporate governance 
initiatives have been well received by investors. 
Roughly 28% of the firms in our sample comprising 214 market-traded firms chose 
not to comply with the disclosure regulation. We formulate and test a set of hypotheses 
related to the determinants of this decision and also to the market reaction associated with 
it. 
We find strong support for the hypothesis that non-compliance is more likely for 
firms with lower quality of corporate governance practices. Our estimates imply that a firm 
with a governance score equal to the minimum value in our sample is expected to be over 
7 times more likely to fail to comply with the regulation than an otherwise identical firm 
with a governance score equal to our sample maximum. Similarly, we find that a firm that 
is not listed on either Novo Mercado or Level 2 (the two most demanding BM&FBovespa 
premium listing segments) is expected to be over twice as likely not to comply as an 
otherwise identical firm that is listed in one of these segments. This result is consistent with 
the extant literature. For example, Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) find a negative association 
between deviations from mandatory disclosure and country-level corporate governance 
quality, while Schiehll et al. (2013) show that better governed Brazilian companies are 
more inclined to voluntarily disclose executive stock options programs. 
Our results also lend support for the hypothesis that influential controlling 
shareholders are more inclined towards not complying. It is possible that they have 
personal motivations to adjourn compensation disclosure, such as avoiding security costs, 
potential family or tax litigations, or even creditor and corporate law litigation, which may 
affect their personal assets. In addition, influential controlling shareholders should find it 
easier to bypass corporate governance restrictions and impose their will on the firm. 
Finally, these individuals may be less concerned about the financial consequences of their 
decision either because they have greater clout over politicians, law enforcers, and state-
controlled financing sources or because powerful owners could be perceived as effective 
overseers of managers, thus lowering the importance of disclosure to outside investors. 
We find that state-owned firms are substantially less likely to become non-
compliers. This result is unsurprising because top management pay in these firms has been 
historically capped in Brazil and because the managers of state-owned companies 
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indirectly represent the very entity that enacted the norm requiring compliance. Foreign-
controlled companies are also less likely to rank among non-compliers, perhaps because 
they are used to disclose similar information in their home countries. In contrast, we find 
no evidence that family-controlled firms are particularly less likely to comply. 
Previous research documents that larger companies tend to pay larger 
compensations to their senior managers and directors in many countries, including Brazil 
(PINTO and LEAL, 2013). Consistent with the hypothesis that the willingness to disclose 
detailed compensation information is inversely related to the level of compensation, we 
find that larger firms are significantly more likely to become non-compliers and also report 
a positive association between the likelihood of non-compliance and the aggregate 
compensation paid to the senior management team and the board of directors. 
Profitability is negatively associated with the non-compliance decision in most regressions. 
This result is consistent with the conjectures that companies that are financially constrained 
and/or whose compensation packages are incompatible with their performance are more 
likely to become non-compliers (BEBCHUK and FRIED, 2003). We find no support for the 
hypothesis that non-compliance is less likely for firms with greater external capital 
dependence. 
Next, we investigate the connection between crime rates and the likelihood of non-
compliance. Costa et al. (2012) report a positive association between car theft and total 
robbery rates and the use of the injunction, suggesting that the fear of violence may have 
been an important motivation for the non-complying decision. We gather updated state-
level crime data from the Brazilian Yearbook of Public Safety and find that the original 
2009 crime rates attributed to the state of Minas Gerais were likely misreported. Using the 
revised crime data we run a battery of regressions and find no connection between crime 
rates of any type within the state where the firm is headquartered and the firm’s propensity 
to use the injunction. 
We run an event study around the date when the preliminary injunction was 
confirmed by a higher court, effectively granting firms the option not to comply, to check if 
the market anticipated non-compliance by poorly governed firms. We find a positive 
association between our CG quality proxies and abnormal returns over the event window, 
suggesting that market participants correctly anticipated that lower CG quality firms were 
more likely to use the non-complying option in the future and that this was perceived as a 
value-destroying decision.  
We also investigate share price revisions around the day non-compliance became 
public. We find worse market reactions for firms that are perceived to have better 
corporate CG practices, suggesting that the outside shareholders of relatively better-
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governed firms did not expect non-compliance. However, this result should be interpreted 
with extra care because it may be contaminated by a plethora of information contained in 
the securities exchange filing that becomes public at the same time. 
Taken together, our analysis suggests that the decision to avoid full compliance 
with the disclosure regulation is partly motivated by agency conflicts. Accordingly, the 
negative reaction of outside shareholders focused on the firms from which a different 
behavior was expected (that is, those perceived to have better governance). Such evidence 
is consistent with previous research. For example, Robinson et al. (2011) report that non-
disclosure for US firms is related to excessive compensation. Importantly, our findings 
weaken the arguments related to personal security costs and justify the reactions of the 
investor advisors that recommended a dissenting vote in shareholders meetings of non-
complying firms (CARVALHO and TORRES, 2011). 
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APPENDIX 
Questionnaire, answering procedure and scoring criteria 
 
Question Answering procedure and scoring criteria 
1. Does any company public document includes 
information about policies and established mechanisms to 
handle conflict of interest situations and/or related party 
transactions?  
Verify the FR, code of ethics or conduct, and 
corporate charter. The score is: 0 if the company 
does not disclose this information; 0.5 if the 
company discloses something about this 
information; 1 if the company discloses substantial 
information. 
2. Does the company disclose compensation information 
for senior management and board members, separating 
the amounts paid to management and board, and the 
variable and fixed proportions?  
Verify item 13 of FR. The score is: 0 if the company 
does not separate board and management and 
fixed and variable compensation; 0.5 if it separates 
board and management or fixed or variable; 1 if it 
separates board and management and fixed and 
variable. 
3. Did the company present any opinion in the 
independent auditor report in the last five years that was 
not unqualified?  
Verify explanatory notes in the financial statements. 
The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
4. Does the company website have an investors relations 
section containing its Annual Report? 
The document must be clearly identified as the 
Annual Report from the previous year, must be in 
the Investors Relations area, and cannot be the 
Management Report, required by CVM. The score 
is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
5. Does the company website contain the presentations 
made to securities analysts?  
Presentations must refer, at least, to the last quarter 
of the previous year or previous year. The score is: 
0 if answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
6. Does the Annual Report includes a specific section 
dedicated to the implementation of corporate governance 
principles?  
Verify the Annual Report and website. The 
information must be substantial and not simply 
descriptive of board membership and ownership 
structure. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if answer 
is yes. 
7. Are the Board of Directors Chair and the CEO different 
persons?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if 
answer is yes. 
8. Does the company have board committees reported in 
public information such as the Corporate Charter, Annual 
Report, website, FR?  
Financial institutions must have an audit committee 
to comply with Central Bank regulation and those 
do not count for a positive score. The score is: 0 if 
answer is no; 1 if answer is yes. 
9. Is the board only made up of outside directors, with the 
exception of the CEO?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if there are other 
managers in addition to the CEO; 1 otherwise.  
10. Is the board size between 5 and 9 members, as 
recommended by the IBGC Code of Best Practices?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if 
answer is yes. 
11. Do board members serve consecutive one or two-year 
terms, as recommended by the IBGC Code of Best 
Practices?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if 
answer is yes. 
12. Is the percentage of non-voting shares in total capital 
less than 20%?  
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if 
answer is yes. 
13. Is the percentage of voting shares of the controlling 
block equal or less than its percentage of all kinds of 
shares altogether?  
Verify the company charter and shareholders 
agreement. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if 
answer is yes. 
14. Are loans to the controlling shareholder or other 
related parties prohibited in the company charter or 
shareholders agreement? 
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if 
answer is yes. 
15. Does the corporate charter facilitate shareholder 
participation in general meetings by not requiring the 
Verify the company charter. The score is: 0 if the 
company requires both the previous remittance of 
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previous remittance of documentation proving the 
shareholder status and adopting the principle of good 
faith?   
documentation proving the shareholder status and 
does not adopt the principle of good faith; 0.5 if it 
either requires the previous remittance of 
documentation proving the shareholder status or 
does not adopt the principle of good faith; 1 if 
answer is yes. 
16. At least one of the affirmatives below is true: 
a) the company concedes one vote to each share, of any 
kind 
b) the company concedes the right to vote to non-voting 
shares in greater impact decisions 
Verify the company charter. The score is: 0 if non-
voting shares never vote; 0.5 the company 
concedes the right to vote to non-voting shares in 
greater impact decisions or if the company has only 
voting shares but presents voting limits per 
shareholder or golden shares; 1 if it abides to the 
one share, one vote, principle.   
17. Does the company grant mandatory bid rights besides 
what is legally required?  
The score is: 0 if no rights besides the legal rights 
are granted; 0.5 the company extend extra 
mandatory bid rights to either voting or non-voting 
shares, but not both; 1 the company extend extra 
mandatory bid rights to both voting and non-voting 
shares, if any.  
18. Is the company control direct? 
The score is: 1 if the direct controlling shareholder is 
an individual, institutional investor, foreign entity, 
the state, or a fully owned holding company of one 
of the previous owner types; 0 otherwise.  
19. Do shareholders agreements abstain from directing or 
constraining the right to vote of any board member, or 
from appointing any senior manager? 
Verify FR and shareholders agreements. The score is 
0 if the answer is no; 1 if answer is yes.  
20. Is the free-float equal or larger than 25%, as required 
by the premium listing segments of BM&FBovespa? 
Verify the FR. The score is: 0 if answer is no; 1 if 




                                                             
1  Departing from the commonly accepted premise that the CEO and the Chairman receive the largest 
compensation among the members from the senior management team and the board of directors, 
respectively. 
2 Brazil’s murder rate is 21 per 100 000 people, lower than those of Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and 
South Africa, among the larger emerging economies, but higher than other large emerging and developed 
markets, such as the US, where the rate is 4.8, according to the Wikipedia website information extracted 
from the latest United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) statistics 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate, retrieved on 11 February 
2013).  
3 A Corporate Governance Yearbook published by Capital Aberto Magazine based on an analysis of the 99 
largest listed companies in Brazil has shown that none of them has disclosed the individual compensation of 
their executives in 2012. As a result, 0% of Brazilian companies voluntarily comply with IBGC 
recommendations of disclosing the compensation of their executives on an individual basis. The full 
publication (in Portuguese) is available at 
http://www.capitalaberto.com.br/index.php?pag=3&sec=10012&p1=3&p2=173     
4 An English version of the IBGC Code of Best Practices is available at 
http://www.ibgc.org.br/CodeBestPractices.aspx  
5  Medida Cautelar n. 17350-RJ (2010/0168534-8) is the injunction relief, in legal suit n. 
2010.5101002888-5 filed at the 5ª Vara Federal do Rio de Janeiro, RJ, the 5th Federal Court of the state of 
Rio de Janeiro.  
6 Details of PDG case are available at 
http://www.capitalaberto.com/english/ler_artigo.php?pag=2&sec=89&i=3488&btxt=pdg 
7 Controlling shareholders are liable for minority shareholders losses that stem from several types of acts, 
such as corporate restructuring events and related party transactions, among others, that result in gains to 
controlling shareholders in detriment of other shareholders, according to article 117 of Law 6404 of 1976, 
the corporate law. 
8  Labor, tax, and family court judges are notorious for using the on-line seizure of the personal bank 
accounts of the administrators of companies, a behavior that is deemed abusive by many law professionals, 
as well as the seizure of assets and properties. Thus, business owners, given the constant risk of exposure to 
labor courts, for instance, have incentives to place some of their assets in friendly hands or disguise their 
ownership of businesses, by making other people legally responsible for them. The deadly fire of the Kiss 
nightclub in southern Brazil, that killed 241 young people, gained the world news in 2013. Police 
investigation revealed that the legal owners of the nightclub were actually the sister and mother of one of its 
de facto owners. See, for example, http://jus.com.br/revista/texto/6428/os-principios-constitucionais-a-luz-
da-celeridade-processual-e-a-penhora-on-line, regarding abuses of the on-line asset seizure by judges.  
9 There is an important caveat peculiar to Brazil that should be noted. The National Economic and Social 
Development Bank (BNDES) is a large institution and the main source of long-term debt financing in the 
country, with disbursements of the order of US$ 78 billion in 2012, placing it among the most important 
world development institutions when compared to the total World Bank Group gross disbursements of US$ 
24 billion in 2012 (The World Bank Group, 2012, p. 20). 
10 This results from an interpretation of article 37 of the Constitution of Brazil. However, the pay cap for 
state-owned company managers is been currently challenged in court. For more details on this issue, please 
see http://www.conjur.com.br/2012-nov-16/sociedades-economia-mista-nao-submetem-teto-
remuneratorio.  
11 (IBGC - Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa, 2012) surveys remuneration in Brazilian listed 
companies and reports a median total annual compensation of BRL 465,174 (about USD 232,600) for 
senior executives in state-owned companies, contrasting with a median of BRL 1,191,131 in family-
controlled firms and BRL 2,971,000 in widely-held companies. The survey recounts a median total annual 
compensation of BRL 74,063 for directors of state-owned companies, compared to medians of BRL 144,000 
and BRL 157,115 in family-controlled and widely held companies, respectively. Pinto and Leal (2013) report 
similar results. The survey (in Portuguese) is available for download at the IBGC website at 
http://www.ibgc.org.br/Pesquisas.aspx.   
12 The liquidity index is computed as 100×(p/P)×[(n/N)×(v/V)]0,5 by the Economatica® database, where, 
for a certain period and specific company, p is the number of days with at least one trade in the stock, P is 
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the total number of days, n is the number of trades in the stock, N is the total number of trades in the 
market, v is volume traded in the stock, and V is total volume traded in the market.  
13 The interested reader may obtain more details about the requirements of each level at the BM&FBovespa 
website (http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br) or in the articles by Carvalho and Pennacchi (2012), Braga-Alves 
and Shastri (2011), Leal (2010), Silveira and Saito (2009), and Chavez and Silva (2009). 
14 We draw these inferences by estimating the Average Partial Effect (APE) after the Probit estimation. The first 
step to estimate the APE is to compute the probability of non-compliance for each firm in our sample after 
fixing the variable of interest at some specific value (for example, CGI score = 19) while all other variables 
take their original value in the sample. Then, we compute the sample average of these estimated 
probabilities. Next, we repeat the procedure fixing the variable of interest at another specific value (for 
example, CGI score = 3.5). The difference between the two resulting averages (the APE) is an estimate of 
the effect of changing the variable of interest (for example, the CGI score from 19 to 3.5) while holding 
constant all other variables. For details, see Wooldridge (2010, p. 577). The other APEs reported in the 
paper were computed analogously. 

